Nomothetic vs Idiographic
Nomothetic is based on what Kant described as a tendency to generalize, and is typical for the natural sciences. It describes the effort to derive laws that explain types or categories of objective phenomena, in general.
Idiographic is based on what Kant described as a tendency to specify, and is typical for the humanities. It describes the effort to understand the meaning of contingent, unique, and often cultural or subjective phenomena.
From Hendrik Vollmer's "What kind of game is everyday interaction?":
Microsociological and game-theoretical analyses of social situations often articulate divergent views of what social situations are about and how they should be investigated: ethnographic documentation and narrative reconstruction on the one hand, measurement and modelling on the other, ideographic [sic] versus nomothetic reasoning, affinities to phenomenology and social constructivism on the one hand, and economics, physics, or biology on the other. Indications of reciprocal recognition are rare and the notorious image of the "two sociologies" (Dawe, 1970) suggests itself.
crispyoh, baby
point 0, because it's so usual, fuck Kant. I agree with Nietzsche:
It seems to me that there is everywhere an attempt at present to divert attention from the actual influence which Kant exercised on German philosophy, and especially to ignore prudently the value which he set upon himself. Kant was first and foremost proud of his Table of Categories; with it in his hand he said: “This is the most difficult thing that could ever be undertaken on behalf of metaphysics.” Let us only understand this “could be”! He was proud of having DISCOVERED a new faculty in man, the faculty of synthetic judgment a priori.
(from Beyond Good and Evil)point 1, I feel like there's this crazy split between "predictive" and "non-predictive" sciences that pretends to be about objective vs. subjective. In reality, I think this comes down to the ability to run experiments or consider "natural experiments" with few enough variables that we can make meaningful assertions about idealizations, and I don't really think Economics falls into this category even though culturally it assumes it does.
point 2, I think that, despite all my big talk, I do believe that "predictive" sciences are the life blood. but I also believe our idea of what "prediction" has to look like is ridiculous. repeatable experiments? get out of here! there are too many things we want to think about that could never be repeated. rather, we need to quantify the robustness of a theory under changes we expect to happen. My sister sent me a book called Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings by Wimsatt that she says expounds on exactly this, will report back